Abstract-Thanks to the widespread deployment of TLS, users can access private data over channels with end-to-end confidentiality and integrity. What they cannot do, however, is prove to third parties the provenance of such data, i.e., that it genuinely came from a particular website. Existing approaches either introduce undesirable trust assumptions or require serverside modifications.
I. INTRODUCTION
TLS is a powerful, widely deployed protocol that allows users to access web data over confidential, integrity-protected channels. But TLS has a serious limitation: it doesn't allow a user to prove to third parties that a piece of data she has accessed authentically came from a particular website. As a result, data use is often restricted to its point of origin, curtailing data portability by users, a right acknowledged by recent regulations such as GDPR [4] .
Specifically, when a user accesses data online via TLS, she cannot securely export it, without help (hence permission) from the current data holder. Vast quantities of private data are thus intentionally or unintentionally locked up in the "deep web"-the part of the web that isn't publicly accessible. Moreover, even public web data's value can't be fully realized, as there's no secure way to relay it to systems that may lack internet connections, such as smart contracts and IoT devices.
To understand the problem, suppose Alice wants to prove to Bob that she's over 18. Currently, age verification services [1] require users to upload IDs and detailed personal information, which raises privacy concerns. But various websites, such as company payroll records or DMV websites, can in principle serve as sources of verified birth dates. Alice could send a screenshot of her birth date from an online payroll account system, but this is easily forged. And even if the screenshot could somehow be proven authentic, it would leak informationrevealing her exactly birth date, not just that she's over 18 .
Initially proposed to prove provenance of online data to smart contracts, oracles are a step towards exporting TLSprotected data to other systems with provenance and integrity assurances. Existing schemes, however, have serious technical limitations. They either only work with deprecated TLS versions and offer no privacy from the oracle (e.g., TLSNotary [3] ) or rely on trusted hardware (e.g., Town Crier [62]), against which various attacks have recently emerged, e.g., [18] .
Another class of oracle schemes assumes server-side cooperation, mandating that servers install TLS extensions (e.g., [50] ) or change application-layer logic (e.g., [23] , [61] ). Server-facilitated oracle schemes suffer from two fundamental problems. First, they break legacy compatibility, causing a significant barrier to wide adoption. Moreover, such solutions only provide conditional exportability because the web servers have the sole discretion to determine which data can be exported, and can censor export attempts at will. A mechanism that allows users to export any data they have access to would enable a whole host of currently unrealizable applications.
A. DECO
To address the above problems, we propose DECO, a decentralized oracle for TLS. Unlike oracle schemes that require per-website support, DECO is source-agnostic and supports any website running standard TLS. Unlike solutions that rely on websites' participation, DECO requires no serverside cooperation. Thus a single instance of DECO could enable anyone to become an oracle for any website.
DECO makes rich Internet data-both public and privateaccessible with authenticity assurances to a wide range of applications, including ones that cannot access the Internet such as smart contracts. DECO could fundamentally shift today's model of web data dissemination by providing private data delivery with an option for transfer to third parties or public release. This technical capability highlights potential future legal and regulatory challenges, but also anticipates the creation and delivery of appealing new services. Importantly, DECO does not require trusted hardware, unlike alternative approaches that could achieve a similar vision, e.g., [41] , [62] .
At a high level, the prover commits to a piece of data D and proves to the verifier that D came from a TLS server S and optionally a statement π D about D. E.g., in the example of proving age, the statement π D could be the predicate "D = y/m/d is Alice's date of birth and y − 2019 > 18."
Informally, DECO achieves authenticity-that the verifier is convinced only if the asserted statement about D is true and D is indeed obtained from website S. DECO also provides privacy in that the verifier only learns the that the statement π D holds for some D obtained from S.
B. Technical challenges
Designing DECO with the required security and practical performance, while using legacy-(TLS)-compatible primitives, introduces several important technical challenges. The main challenge stems from the fact that TLS generates symmetric encryption and authentication keys that are shared by the client (prover in DECO) and web server. Thus, the client can forge arbitrary TLS session data, in the sense of signing the data with valid authentication keys.
To address this challenge, DECO introduces a novel threeparty handshake protocol among the prover, verifier, and web server that creates an unforgeable commitment by the prover to the verifier on a piece of TLS session data D. The verifier can check that D is authentically from the TLS server. From the prover's perspective, the three-party handshake preserves the security of TLS in presence of a malicious verifier. Efficient selective opening. After committing to D, the prover proves statements about the commitment. Although arbitrary statements can be supported in theory, we optimize for what are likely to be the most popular applications-revealing only substrings of the response to the verifier. We call such statements selective opening. Fine-grained selective opening allows users to hide sensitive information and reduces the input length to the subsequent proofs.
A naïve solution would involve expensive verifiable decryption of TLS records using generic zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), but we achieve an orders-of-magnitude efficiency improvement by exploiting the TLS record structure. For example, a direct implementation of verifiable decryption of one TLS record would involve proving correct execution of a circuit of 512 AES invocations in zero-knowledge, whereas by leveraging the MAC-then-encrypt structure of CBC-HMAC, we accomplish the same with only 3 AES invocations. Context integrity. Selective opening allows the prover to only reveal a substring D ′ of the server's response D. However, a substring may mean different things depending on when it appears and a malicious prover could cheat by quoting out of context. Therefore we need to prove not just that D ′ appears in D, but that it appears in the expected context, i.e., D ′ has context integrity 1 with respect to D. Context-integrity attacks can be thwarted if the session content is structured and can be parsed. Fortunately most web data takes this form (e.g., in JSON or HTML). A generic solution is to parse the entire session and prove that the revealed part belongs to the necessary branch of a parse tree. But, under certain constraints that web data generally satisfies, parsing the entire session is not necessary. We propose a novel two-stage parsing scheme where the prover pre-processes the session content, and only parses the outcome that is usually much smaller. We draw from the definition of equivalence of programs, as used in programming language theory, to build a formal framework to reason about the security of two-stage parsing schemes. We provide several practical realizations for specific grammars. Our definitions and constructions generalize to other oracles too. For example, it could prevent a generic version of the content-hidden attack mentioned in [50] .
C. Implementation and evaluation
We designed and implemented DECO as a complete endto-end system. To demonstrate the system's power, we implemented three applications: 1) a confidentiality-preserving financial instrument using smart contracts; 2) converting legacy credentials to anonymous credentials; and 3) verifiable claims against price discrimination.
Our experiments with these three applications show that DECO is highly efficient. In the LAN setting, it takes 1.40s to perform the three-party handshake and 0.146s to verify an HMAC tag in 2PC. It takes 3s to 10s to generate zeroknowledge proofs for the applications described above. More details are provided in Section VII. Contributions. In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We introduce DECO, a provably secure decentralized oracle scheme, along with an implementation and performance evaluation. DECO is the first oracle scheme for modern TLS versions that doesn't require trusted hardware or serverside modifications. We provide an overview of the protocol in Section III and specify the full protocol in Section IV.
• Selective opening: In Section V-A, we introduce a broad class of statements for TLS records that can be proven efficiently in zero-knowledge. They allow users to open only substrings of a session-data commitment. The optimized statements achieve an orders-of-magnitude efficiency improvement over generic ZKPs.
• Context-integrity attacks and mitigation: We identify a new class of context-integrity attacks that is universal to privacy-preserving oracles (e.g., [50] ) but has not previously been sufficiently addressed. A generic solution would involve expensive proofs of correct parsing, but our solution involves a novel two-stage parsing scheme that greatly reduces the computational cost. In Section V-B, we provide a formal framework to reason about the security of the twostage parsing scheme and several practical realizations.
• Security definitions and proofs: Oracles are a key part of the smart contract ecosystem, but a coherent security definition has been lacking. We formalize and strengthen existing oracle schemes and present a formal security definition using an ideal functionality in Section III-B. We prove the functionality is securely realized by our protocols in Appendix C.
• Applications and evaluation: In Section VI, we present three representative applications that showcase DECO's capabilities, and evaluate them in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Transport Layer Security (TLS)
We now provide necessary background on the TLS handshake and record protocols on which DECO builds. Throughout the paper we focus on TLS 1.2, but also describe how to generalize our techniques to TLS 1.3.
TLS is a family of protocols that provides privacy and data integrity between two communicating applications. Roughly speaking, it consists of two protocols: a handshake protocol that sets up the session using asymmetric cryptography, establishing shared client and server keys for the next protocol, the record protocol, in which data is transmitted with confidentiality and integrity protection using symmetric cryptography.
1) Handshake:
In the handshake protocol, the server and client first agree on a set of cryptographic algorithms (also known as a cipher suite). They then authenticate each other (client authentication optional), and finally securely compute a shared secret to be used for the subsequent record protocol.
DECO supports the forward secure elliptic curve DH key exchange with ephemeral secrets (ECDHE [14] ), which is similar to DH key exchange but an ephemeral key pair is used.
2) Record protocol: To transmit application-layer data (e.g., HTTP messages) in TLS, the record protocol first fragments the application data D into fixed sized plaintext records D = (D 1 , · · · , D n ), each of which is of size 16KB or less. Each record is usually padded to a multiple of blocks (e.g., 128 bits). The record protocol then optionally compresses the data, applies a MAC, encrypts, and transmits the result. Received data is decrypted, verified, decompressed, reassembled, and then delivered to higher-level protocols. The specific cryptographic operations depend on the negotiated ciphersuite. DECO supports the AES cipher in two commonly used modes: CBC-HMAC and GCM. Here we describe the use of these primitives in TLS using CBC-HMAC as an example.
Roughly, the record protocol applies MAC-then-encrypt to convert plaintext records to payload messages. For each properly padded plaintext record D, the sender first computes a MAC tag σ = HMAC(k MAC , κ D) where κ is some metadata including the sequence number, version and length of D, then encrypts the record and the tag as M = CBC(k Enc , D σ). M is transmitted on the wire. The receiver reverses the process to obtain application-layer data. Each direction of the communication uses a separate set of keys.
3) Differences between TLS 1.2 and 1.3: In TLS 1.3, the list of supported symmetric algorithms has been pruned of all legacy algorithms, and is confined to AEAD algorithms. The handshake flow has also been restructured. All handshake messages after the ServerHello are now encrypted. Finally, a different PRF is used. For a complete description, see [49] .
B. Multi-party computation
Consider a group of n parties P 1 , . . . , P n , each of whom holds some secret s i . Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows them to jointly compute f (s i , · · · , s n ) without leaking any information other than the output of f , i.e., P i learns nothing about s j =i .
Security for MPC protocols generally considers an adversary that corrupts t players and attempts to learn the private information of an honest player. Two-party computation (2PC) refers to the special case of n = 2 and t = 1. A semi-honest or honest-but-curious adversary follows the protocol description but learns whatever information is leaked by the protocol transcript; a malicious adversary may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. Moreover, the corruptions may be static, meaning the adversary chooses which parties to corrupt at the beginning of the protocol, or adaptive, i.e., the adversary can choose which parties to corrupt adaptively during the protocol execution. In this paper, we consider a malicious adversary and static corruptions. We refer the reader to [40] for a full discussion of the model and formal security definitions.
There are two general approaches to building protocols for secure two-party computation. In garbled-circuit protocols based on Yao's protocol [60] , the function f is encoded as a boolean circuit, and these protocols are therefore best-suited for bitwise operations (e.g., SHA256). Other protocols are based on threshold secret sharing and these protocols tend to be best suited for arithmetic operations.
The functions that we compute in this paper using 2PC are composed of both bitwise and arithmetic operations. We separate them into these two components, and use the optimized garbled-circuit protocol from [59] for the bitwise operations and the secret-sharing based MtA protocol from [31] for the arithmetic operations.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
In this section we state the problem we try to solve with DECO and present a high-level overview of its architecture.
A. Problem statement: Decentralized oracles
Broadly, we investigate protocols for building "oracles," i.e., entities that can prove provenance and properties of online data. Specifically, the goal is to allow a prover P to prove to a verifier V that a piece of data came from a particular website S and optionally prove statements about such data in zero-knowledge, keeping the data itself secret. Accessing the data may require private input (e.g., a password) from P and such private information should be kept secret from V as well.
We focus on servers running TLS, the most widely deployed security protocol suite on the Internet. However, TLS alone does not prove data provenance. Although TLS uses publickey signatures for authentication, it uses symmetric-key primitives to protect the integrity and confidentiality of exchanged messages, using a shared session key established at the beginning of each session. Hence P, who knows this symmetric key, cannot prove statements about cryptographically authenticated TLS data to a third party.
Functionality F Oracle between S, P and V Input: The TLS server S holds a mapping Content : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * . The prover P holds some private input θs. The verifier V inputs a query template Query and a response predicate Stmt. Functionality:
• Send (Query, Stmt) to P. Wait for P to reply with "ok" and abort if other messages are received.
• Let Q = Query(θs) and R = Content(Q). Send |Q|, |R| to A.
• Send (Q, R) to P.
• Send V a delayed public output (Stmt(R), S). A web server itself could assume the role of an oracle, e.g., by simply signing data. However, server-facilitated oracles would not only incur a high adoption cost, but also put users at a disadvantage: the web server could impose arbitrary constraints on the oracle capability. We are interested in a scheme where anyone can prove provenance of any data she can access, without needing to rely on a single, central point of control, such as the web server providing the data.
We tackle these challenges by introducing a tool for decentralized oracles that doesn't rely on cooperation from web servers or trusted parties. The problem is much more challenging than for previous oracles, as it precludes solutions that require servers to modify their code or deploy new software, e.g., [50] , or use of prediction markets, e.g., [8] , [48] , while at the same time going beyond these previous approaches by supporting proofs on arbitrary predicates over data. Another approach, introduced in [62] , is to use trusted execution environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX. The downside is that recent attacks [18] may deter some users from trusting TEEs.
B. Notation and definitions
We use P to denote the prover, V the verifier and S the TLS server. We use letters in boldface (e.g., M ) to denote vectors and M i to denote the ith element in M .
We model the essential properties of an oracle using an ideal functionality F Oracle in Fig. 1 . F Oracle accepts a secret parameter θ s (e.g., a password) from the prover P, a query template Query and a statement Stmt from V. A query template is a function that takes P's secret θ s and returns a complete query. The verifier V specifies public parameters in a query template, and the prover P can later prove that the query sent to the server is well-formed, i.e., built from the template, without revealing the secret. An exemple query template would be Query(θ s ) = "stock price of GOOG on Jan 1st, 2020 with API key = θ s ". The statement Stmt is a function that V wishes to evaluate on the server's response. Following the previous example, as the response R is a number, the following statement would compare it with a threshold: Stmt(R) = "R > $1, 000".
We assume the server S knows or can learn responses to user queries, an ability we model as knowledge of a mapping Content from queries to responses. After P acknowledges the query template and the predicate (by sending "ok"), F Oracle retrieves a response R from S using a query built from the template. We assume an honest server, so R is the ground truth. Finally, F Oracle sends Stmt(R) and the data source to V.
As stated in Definition 1, we are interested in oracles that don't require any server-side modifications or cooperation, i.e., S follows the unmodified TLS protocol. Adversarial model and security properties. We consider a static, malicious network adversary A. Parties corrupted by A may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol and reveal their states to A. As a network adversary, A learns the message length from F Oracle since TLS is not length-hiding.
In a decentralized oracle protocol, P communicates with S in a standard TLS-based interaction. P and V may interact as well. We assume that the TLS server is honest. For a given query Q, denote the server's honest response by S(Q). We require the security holds when either the prover or the verifier is corrupted. The functionality F Oracle reflects the following security guarantees:
• Prover-integrity: A malicious P cannot forge content provenance S, nor can she cause S to accept invalid queries or respond incorrectly to valid ones. Specifically, if the verifier inputs (Query, Stmt) and outputs (b, S), then P must have sent Q = Query(θ s ) to S in a TLS session and received a response R = S(Q) such that b = Stmt(R).
• Verifier-integrity: A malicious V cannot cause P to receive incorrect responses. Specifically, if P outputs (Q, R) then R must be the server's response to query Q submitted by P, i.e., R = S(Q).
• Privacy: A malicious V learns only public information (Query, S) and the evaluation of Stmt(R).
C. A strawman protocol
In presenting our design of DECO, we start with a strawman protocol and incrementally build up to the full protocol.
We focus on two widely used representative TLS cipher suites: CBC-HMAC and AES-GCM. Our technique generalizes to other ciphers (e.g., Chacha20-Poly1305, etc.) as well. Throughout this section we use CBC-HMAC to illustrate the ideas and with discussion of GCM deferred to later sections. A strawman protocol. A strawman protocol that realizes F Oracle between (P, V) is as follows. P queries the server S and records all messages sent to and received from the server inQ = (Q 1 , . . . ,Q n ) andR = (R 1 , . . . ,R n ), respectively. LetM denote (Q,R) and (k MAC , k Enc ) be the session keys. She then proves in zero-knowledge that 1) eachR i decrypts to (R i , σ i ), a plaintext record and a MAC tag; 2) each MAC tag σ i for R i verifies against k MAC ; and 3) the desired statement evaluates to b on the response, i.e., b = Stmt((R 1 , . . . , R n )). Using the now standard notation introduced in [21] , the prover P computes She also proves that Q is well-formed as Q = Query(θ s ) similarly in a proof p q and sends (p q , p r , k MAC ,M , S) to V. Given thatM is an authentic transcript of the TLS session, the prover-integrity property seems to hold. Intuitively, CBC-HMAC ciphertexts bind to the underlying plaintexts, thus the messagesM can be treated as secure commitments [32] to the session data. That is, a givenM can only be opened (i.e., decrypted and MAC checked) to a unique message. The binding property prevents P from openingM to a different message other than the original session with the server.
Unfortunately, this intuition is flawed. The strawman protocol fails completely because it cannot ensure the authenticity ofM . The prover P has the session keys, and thus she can include the encryption of arbitrary messages inM . Moreover, the zero-knowledge proofs that P needs to construct involve decrypting and hashing the entire transcript, which can be prohibitively expensive. For the protocol to be practical, we need to significantly reduce the cost.
D. Overview of DECO
The critical failing of our strawman approach is that P learns the session key before she commits to the session. One key idea in DECO is to withhold the MAC key from P until after she commits. The TLS session between P and the server S must still remain secure in terms of confidentiality and integrity. Moreover, the protocol must not degrade performance below the requirements of TLS (e.g., triggering a timeout).
As shown in Fig. 2 , DECO is a three-phase protocol. The first phase is a novel three-party handshake protocol in which the prover P, the verifier V, and the TLS server S establish session keys that are secret-shared between P and V. After the handshake is a post-handshake phase during which P accesses the server following the standard TLS protocol, but with help from V. Finally, P proves statements about the data she retrieved from the server in a proof generation phase.
1) Three-party handshake: Essentially, P and V jointly act as a TLS client. They negotiate a shared session key with S in a secret-shared form. We emphasize that this phase, like the rest of DECO, is completely transparent to S, requiring no server-side modifications or cooperation.
For the CBC-HMAC cipher suite, at the end of the threeparty handshake, P and V receive k
. As with the standard handshake, both P and S gets the encryption key k Enc .
The aforementioned session-data commitment can be made unforgeable as follows. At the end of the session, P first commits to the session inM as before, then V reveals her share k MAC V . From V's perspective, the three-party handshake protocol ensures that a fresh MAC key (for each direction) is used for every session, despite the influence of a potential malicious prover, and that the keys are unknown to P until she commits. Without knowledge of the MAC key, P cannot forge or tamper with session data before committing to it. The unforgeability of the session-data commitment in DECO thus reduces to the unforgeability of the MAC scheme used in TLS.
Other ciphersuites such as GCM can be supported similarly. In GCM, a single key (for each direction) is used for both encryption and MAC. The handshake protocol similarly secretshares the key between P and V. As we'll present shortly, this leads to a more complex post-handshake protocol and higher computational cost. The details of the handshake protocol are presented in Section IV-A.
2) Post-handshake interaction: Since the session keys are secret-shared, as noted, P and V execute an interactive protocol, acting jointly as a TLS client to finish the session. For CBC-HMAC, they generate and verify tags, while for GCM they perform authenticated encryption and decryption.
Generic MPC would in theory be sufficient to realize DECO, but would not meet our stringent practical performance requirement. We instead introduce custom 2PC protocols that are orders-of-magnitude more efficient than generic solutions. Details are given in Section IV-B.
3) Proof generation:
With unforgeable commitments, if P opens the commitmentM completely (i.e., reveals the encryption key) then V could easily verify the authenticity ofM by checking MACs on the decryption.
Revealing the encryption key forM , however, would breach privacy: it would reveal all session data exchanged between P and S. In theory, P could instead prove any statement Stmt overM in zero knowledge (i.e., without revealing the encryption key). Generic zero-knowledge proof techniques, though, would be prohibitively expensive for many natural choices of Stmt.
DECO instead introduces two techniques to support efficient proofs for a broad, general class of statement Stmt, namely selective opening of a TLS session transcript. Selective opening involves either revealing a substring to V or redacting, i.e., excising, a substring, concealing it from V. We also show how to build on selective opening to give efficient zero-knowledge proofs over selectively opened data.
As an example, Fig. 3 shows a simplified JSON bank statement for Bob. Suppose Bob (P) wants to reveal his checking account balance to V. Revealing the decryption key for his TLS session would be undesirable: it would also reveal the entire statement, including his transactions. Instead, using techniques we introduce, Bob can efficiently reveal only the substring in lines 5-7. Alternatively, if he doesn't mind revealing his savings account balance, he might redact his transactions after line 7.
1 {" name ": " Bob " , 2 " savings a / c ":
" checking a / c ":
" t r a n s a c t i o n s": {...}} The two selective opening modes, revealing and redacting substrings, are useful privacy protection mechanisms. They can also serve as pre-processing for a subsequent zero-knowledge proof. For example, Bob might wish to prove that he has an account with a balance larger than $1000, without revealing the actual balance. He would then prove in zero knowledge a predicate ("balance more than $1000") over the substring that includes his checking account balance.
Selective opening alone, however, is not enough for many applications. This is because the context of a substring affects its meaning. Without what we call context integrity, P could cheat and reveal a substring that falsely appears to prove a claim to V. For example, Bob might not have a balance above $1000. After viewing his bank statement, though, he might in the same TLS session post a message to customer service with the substring "balance": $5000 and then view his pending messages (in a form of reflection attack). He could then reveal this substring to fool V.
Various sanitization heuristics on prover-supplied inputs to V, e.g., truncating session transcripts, could potentially prevent some such attacks, but, like other forms of web application input sanitization, are fragile and prone to attack [53] .
Instead, we introduce a rigorous technique by which session data are explicitly but confidentially parsed. We call this technique zero-knowledge two-stage parsing. The idea is that P parsesM locally in a first stage and then proves to V a statement in zero knowledge about constraints on a resulting substring. For example, in our banking example, if bank-supplied key-value stores are always escaped with a distinguished character λ, then Bob could prove a correct balance by extracting via local parsing and revealing to V a substring "balance": $5000 preceded by λ. We show for a very common class of web API grammars (unique keys) that this two-phase approach yields much more efficient proofs than more generic techniques.
Section V gives more details on proof generation in DECO.
IV. THE DECO PROTOCOL
The DECO protocol consists of a three-party handshake (Section IV-A), followed by 2PC protocols for post-handshake interaction (Section IV-B), and a proof generation phase. We abstract out the details of proof generation to specify the full DECO protocol (Section IV-C) and prove its security.
A. Three-party handshake
The goal of the three-party handshake (3P-HS) is to secretshare between the prover P and verifier V the session keys used in a TLS session with server S. This client-side secret sharing by P and V should be completely transparent to S.
The three-party handshake is specified in Fig. 6 . Below we give text descriptions so formal specifications are not required for understanding. Overview. We assume the TLS server runs the ECDHE key exchange protocol (see Section II for an overview) using an EC group EC(F p ). The handshake proceeds in two steps: first, in a key exchange step P and V compute additive shares of a secret value Z ∈ EC(F p ) shared with the server through ECDHE; second, P and V securely evaluate the TLS-PRF [27] using shares of Z to derive sessions keys.
Specifically, the TLS-PRF is an HMAC-based PRF keyed with the x-coordinate of Z while P (and V) hold Z P (and Z V ) such that Z = Z P + Z V where + is the group operation of EC(F p ). While the PRF can be implemented in a boolean circuit and securely evaluated using a maliciously secure 2PC protocol such as [59], a technical challenge is to harmonize arithmetic operations (i.e., adding two EC points) with bitwise operations (i.e., HMAC).
It is well-known that boolean circuits are not well-suited for arithmetic in large fields. As a concrete estimate, an EC Point addition resulting in just the x coordinate involves 4 subtractions, one modular inversion, and 2 modular multiplications. An estimate of the AND complexity based on the highly optimized circuits of [26] results in over 900,000 AND gates just for the subtractions, multiplications, and modular reductions-not even including inversion, which would require running the Extended Euclidean algorithm inside a circuit.
Duo to the prohibitive cost of adding EC points in a boolean circuit, we first convert the additive shares of an EC point in EC(F p ) to additive shares of its x-coordinate in F p , using the ECtF protocol to be presented shortly. Then the boolean circuit just involves adding two numbers in F p and using the result to key TLS-PRF, which is much less costly than with additive shares of an EC point.
Step 1: key exchange. The public input to the 3P-HS protocol is the elliptic curve group used in ECDHE, denoted G , and the public key of the server S, denoted by Y S . The parties have no private input. At the end of the three-party handshake, S receives session keys k Enc and k MAC . P receives the same encryption key k Enc , while the MAC key is shared between P and V, i.e., P and V receive k
. The prover P initiates the handshake by sending a regular TLS handshake request and a random nonce r c to S (in the ClientHello message). On receiving a certificate, the server nonce r s , and a signed ephemeral DH public key Y S from S (in the ServerHello and ServerKeyExchange messages), P checks the certificate and the signature and forwards it to V. After checking the certificate and the signature, V samples a secret s V and sends her part of the DH public key Y V = s V ·G to P, who then samples another secret s P and sends the combined DH public key s P · G + Y V to S. Note that the shared secret is Z = (s P +s V )·Y , which is unknown to either party assuming the discrete logarithm problem is hard in the chosen group.
Step 2: key derivation. Having established the shared secret Z = (Z x , Z y ) with the server, P and V proceed to derive session keys by evaluating the TLS-PRF on the Z x , the xcoordinate of Z, as specified in the TLS protocol [27] . Note that P and V hold additive shares of Z in the form of EC points. They first convert shares of Z, an EC point, into shares of Z x -which is the input to the TLS-PRF-over the field F p . This conversation happens in the ECtF protocol we now present. Finally, they run a maliciously secure 2PC protocol to evaluate the TLS-PRF on shares of Z x . ECtF: Converting shares of EC points in EC(F p ) to shares in F p . Before introducing our protocol ECtF for converting shares of an EC point in EC(F p ) to shares of its coordinates in F p , we first describe an Mutiplicative-to-Additive (MtA) share-conversion protocol that serves as a building block in ECtF. Then we explain the construction of ECtF itself. a) Building block: the MtA protocol: In an MtA protocol, two parties securely convert multiplicative shares of a secret to additive ones. We use α, β := MtA(a, b) to denote a run of MtA between Alice and Bob with inputs a and b respectively. At the end of the run, Alice and Bob receive α and β such that a · b = α + β. Unless otherwise specified, all arithmetic operations are in some finite field F p . The protocol can be generalized to convert multiple multiplicative shares to additive shares of their inner product without increasing the communication complexity. Namely for vectors a, b ∈ F n p , if α, β := MtA(a, b), then a, b = α + β. See, e.g., [31] for a Paillier [47] -based construction of MtA.
b) The ECtF protocol: The inputs to an ECtF protocol are two EC points P 1 , P 2 ∈ EC(F p ). Suppose (P x , P y ) = P 1 + P 2 where + is the EC group operation, the output of the protocol is α, β ∈ F p such that α + β = P x . Shares of the y-coordinate can be computed similarly but we omit that since TLS only uses the x-coordinate.
Let P i := (x i , y i ) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Specifically, for the curve we consider, P x = λ 2 − x 1 − x 2 where λ = (y2−y1) /(x2−x1). Two ingredients are required to compute shares of P x .
Let [a] denote a 2-out-of-2 sharing of a, i.e., [a] = (a 1 , a 2 ) such that party i has a i for i ∈ {1, 2} while a = a 1 + a 2 . The first ingredient is share inversion: given [a], compute [a −1 ]. As shown in [31] , we can use the inversion protocol of Bar-Ilan and Beaver [11] together with MtA as follows: party i samples a random value r i and executes MtA to compute δ 1 , δ 2 := MtA((a 1 , r 1 ), (r 2 , a 2 )). Note that δ 1 + δ 2 = a 1 · r 2 + a 2 · r 1 . Party i publishes v i = δ i + a i · r i and thus both parties learn v = v 1 +v 2 . Finally, party i outputs β i = a i ·v −1 . The protocol computes a correct sharing of a −1 because β 1 + β 2 = a −1 . Moreover, the protocol doesn't leak a to any party assuming MtA is secure. In fact, party i's view consists of (a 1 +a 2 )(r 1 + r 2 ), which is uniformly random if party i samples uniformly random r i .
The second ingredient is share multiplication: com-
[ab] can be computed using MtA as follows: parties execute MtA to compute
Finally, party i outputs m i = α i + a i · y i . The security and correctness of the protocol can be shown similarly as above.
Putting these two ingredients together, Fig. 7 in the Appendix presents the ECtF protocol. The communication complexity of ECtF is 8 ciphertexts. Secure evaluation of the TLS-PRF. Having computed shares of Z x , the so called premaster secret in TLS, in ECtF, P and V evaluates the TLS-PRF in 2PC to derive session keys. Beginning with the SHA-256 circuit of [22] , we handoptimized the TLS handshake circuit resulting in a circuit with total AND complexity of 779,213.
B. Post-handshake interaction
After the handshake, P and V collectively act as the client to interact with server. At a high level, since the session keys are shared, the two players need to execute a 2PC protocol to verify MAC tags on incoming records, and to create tags for outgoing records. Since MAC tags will be checked for every TLS record during the entire session, the performance requirement precludes direct use of generic 2PC. We devise new, efficient 2PC MAC protocols as discussed below.
1) General security considerations:
In a 2PC MAC protocol, P can compute a MAC tag on a message M while hiding M from V. In TLS, different MAC keys are used for serverto-client and client-to-server communication. For former, P and V run 2PC to verify tags, while for latter P and V run 2PC to create tags on fresh messages.
When checking tags for server-to-client messages, we must ensure that P cannot forge tags on messages that are not originally from the server. Suppose P wishes to verify a tag T on message M . The idea is to have P to first commit to T , then P and V run a 2PC MAC protocol to compute a tag T ′ on message M . P is asked to open the commitment to V and if T = T ′ , V aborts the protocol. Since P doesn't know the MAC key, P cannot compute and commit to a tag on a message that is not from the server.
When creating tags for client-to-server messages, V makes sure MAC tags are created on messages with increasing sequence numbers, as required by TLS. [Deepak: Makes sure how?] This also prevents a malicious P from creating two messages with the same sequence number, because there is no way for V to distinguish which one was sent to the server.
2) CBC-HMAC: The general security considerations discussed above apply to both the cipher suites we support. Below, we describe an efficient protocol for 2PC-HMAC. The protocol is specified in Fig. 8 . Note that P and V hold shares of the MAC key, while P holds the encryption key.
Recall that HMAC of message m with key k is
The key idea in our optimization is to make the computation of the inner hash local to P (i.e., without 2PC). If P knew k ⊕ ipad, she could compute the inner hash. We cannot, though, simply give k ⊕ ipad to P, as she could then learn k and forge MACs. Our optimization exploits the chained structure of Merkle-Damgård in SHA-256. Let H denote SHA-256 and IV the initial hash value. Suppose m 1 and m 2 are two correctly sized blocks. Then H(m 1 m 2 ) is computed as f H (H(m 1 ), m 2 ) , where f H is the one-way compression function of H. After the three-party handshake, P and V execute a simple 2PC protocol to compute s 0 = f H (IV, k MAC ⊕ ipad), and reveal it to P. To compute the inner hash of a message m, P just use s 0 as the IV to compute a hash of m. Revealing s 0 does not reveal k MAC , as f H is assumed to be one-way. Finishing the computation of HMAC then involves computing the outer H in 2PC on the inner hash, a much shorter message. Thus, we manage to reduce the amount of 2PC computation to a few blocks, as opposed to 512 blocks with generic 2PC.
3) AES-GCM: Following the similar methodology, we build optimized post-handshake protocols for AES-GCM in Appendix B. The protocols involve 2PC-AES for each record and therefore higher computational cost and latency compared to 2PC-HMAC. Looking forward, our evaluation results show that for GCM to be practical when V is out of band, i.e., does not communicate with S, as we have thus far considered, P and V must communicate over a low latency network, such as a LAN. We present a highly efficient alternative in which V instead communicates with S.
The idea is to have the verifier V act as a proxy between the prover P and the TLS server S, i.e., P sends/receives messages to/from S through V. The modified flow of the DECO protocol is as follows: after the handshake, P commits to her key share k P then V reveals k V to P. Therefore P now has the entire session key k = k P + k V . As P uses k to continue the session with the server, V records the proxy traffic. After the session concludes, P proves statements about the recorded session the same as before.
Unlike CBC-HMAC, GCM is not committing [32] : for a given ciphertext C encrypted with key k, one knowing k can efficiently find k ′ = k that decrypts C to a different plaintext while passing the integrity check. To prevent such attacks, the above protocol requires P to commit to her key share before learning the session key. Security properties and network assumptions. The verifierintegrity and privacy properties are clear, as a malicious V cannot break the integrity and privacy of TLS (by assumption).
For prover-integrity, though, we need to assume that the proxy can reliably connect to the TLS server. First, we assume the proxy can ascertain that it indeed is connected with S, e.g., via network-layer means such as the IP address. Moreover, we assume messages sent between the proxy and S cannot be tampered with by P, who knows the session keys and thus could modify the session content.
These assumptions have been considered acceptable, e.g., by [57] in a similar proxy setting. In practice, this requires the proxy to have correct and update-to-date DNS records, and that the network between the proxy and the server (e.g., their ISP and the barebones network) are properly secured against traffic injection (note that eavesdropping is fine.) This alternative protocol represents a different performancesecurity trade-off. It's highly efficient because no cryptographic operation is involved after the handshake, but it reProt DECO Prot S : follow the standard TLS protocol.
Prot P and Prot V :
• V sends the query template Query and the statement Stmt to be proven over the response to P.
• P examines them and chooses whether to proceed. If so, P sets R = ∅ and starts the handshake.
• (Handshake) P, V execute the three-party handshake protocol. P gets the encryption key k Enc and a share of the MAC key k MAC P , while V gets the other share of the MAC key k MAC V .
• (Query) P computes a query using the template Q = Query(θs).
P invokes 2PC-HMAC with V to compute a tag τ . P sendsQ = Enc(k Enc , Q τ ) to S.
• (Response) upon receiving a recordR i from S, P invokes 2PC-HMAC with V to check its tag. Then addR i to R. 
C. Full protocol
Having specified the three-party handshake and posthandshake protocols, we are ready to present the full DECO protocol, as specified in Fig. 4 .
For clarity, we abstract away the details of zeroknowledge proofs in an ideal functionality F ZK like that in [35] . On receiving ("prove", x, w) from P, F ZK sends ("proof", π(x, w), w) to V where x, w, π are defined as follows: Assuming functionalities for secure 2PC and ZKPs, it can be shown that Prot DECO securely realizes F Oracle under sequential composition, as stated in Theorem 1. We provide a simulationbased proof (sketch) in Appendix C. Supporting TLS 1.3. The specification of TLS 1.3 [49] has been recently published. We refer readers to Section II for the differences from TLS 1.2, our main focus here. To support TLS 1.3, the three-party handshake protocol in DECO must be adapted to a new handshake flow and a different PRF circuit. Moreover, since CBC-HMAC is not supported by TLS 1.3, DECO can only be used in GCM mode.
V. PROOF GENERATION
In this section, we focus on optimizations for the proof generation phase of Prot DECO . Section V-A presents selective opening, efficient zero-knowledge proofs that a substring R ′ appeared in the response R. However, as noted previously, a substring may mean different things depending on where it appears. In Section V-B, we show how to efficiently prove that a substring appears in the right context.
A. Selective opening
Recall that at the end of the DECO protocol, the prover P commits to the ciphertextM of a TLS session and proves to V that the plaintext M satisfies certain properties. Without loss of generality, we assumeM and M contain only one TLS record, and henceforth call them the ciphertext record and the plaintext record. Multi-record sessions can be handled by repeating the protocol for each record.
Proving only the provenance of M is easy: just reveal the encryption keys. But this sacrifices privacy. Alternatively, P could prove any statement about M using general zeroknowledge techniques. But such proofs are often expensive.
Selective opening-proving that a substring s appears in M without revealing the rest of the plaintext-is a middle ground between these two that provides privacy, yet admits of efficient proofs. We introduce techniques that allow P to efficiently reveal or redact substrings in the plaintext. Suppose the plaintext record is composed of chunks M = (B 1 , · · · , B n ) (details of chunking are discussed shortly). Selective opening allows P to prove that the ith chunk of M is B i , without revealing the rest of M ; we refer to this as Reveal mode. It can also prove that M −i is the same as M but with the ith chunk removed, i.e.,
We call this Redact mode. Both modes are simple, but useful for practical privacy goals.
The granularity of selective opening depends on the cipher suite, which we now discuss. CBC-HMAC. Recall that for proof generation, P holds both the encryption and MAC keys k Enc and k MAC , while V only has the MAC key k MAC . Assuming SHA-256 and 128-bit AES are used, recall that a plaintext record M is first chunked into 64-byte SHA-256 blocks to compute a MAC tag then chunked into 32-byte AES blocks to compute the ciphertextM . a) Revealing a TLS record: A naïve way to prove that a ciphertext recordM encrypts a plaintext record M without revealing k Enc is to prove correct encryption of each AES block in ZKP. Doing so, however, would require up to 515 invocations of AES in ZKP (512 blocks of plaintext and 3 blocks of tag), resulting in impractical performance.
Leveraging the MAC-then-encrypt structure, the same can be done using only 3 invocations of AES in ZKP. The idea is to prove that the last few blocks ofM encrypt a tag σ and reveal the plaintext directly. Specifically, P computes π = ZK-PoK{k Enc : B 513 B 514 B 515 = CBC(k Enc , σ)} and sends (M , π) to V. Then V verifies π and checks the MAC tag over M (note that V knows the MAC key.) This optimized approach only takes 3 AES invocations in ZKP. The security of this optimization relies on unforgeability of HMAC [12] .
b) Revealing a record with redacted blocks: Suppose P would like to redact the ith block, i.e., to prove that
In total this would cost 3 AES and 256 SHA-256 hashes in ZKP.
Leveraging the chained structure of HMAC, we can reduce the cost to 3 AES and 1 SHA-256. In a first step, P proves the last few blocks ofM encrypt a tag σ. Then, P computes π = ZK-PoK{B
Unlike CBC-HMAC, revealing a few blocks is very efficient in GCM. We defer details about GCM to Appendix B3.
In summary, CBC-HMAC allows efficient selective revealing at the TLS record-level and redaction at block level in DECO, while GCM allows efficient revealing at block level.
Selective opening can also serve as pre-processing to reduce the input length for a subsequent zero-knowledge proof. For example, in Fig. 3 , instead of revealing the account balance, Bob might want to prove that the balance is above $1000.
B. Two-stage parsing
The example shown earlier in Fig. 3 illustrates how context within a plaintext record could affect the meaning of a substring. In this section we present techniques for proving a substring appears in the context expected by the verifier. We refer to this property as context integrity. We now define it formally and show how we achieve it in DECO.
1) Specification of contexts:
We assume the TLS-protected data sent to and from a given server S has a well-defined context-free grammar G.
In a slight abuse of notation, we let G denote both a grammar and the language it specifies. Thus, R ∈ G denotes a string R in the language given by G. We assume that G is unambiguous, i.e., every R ∈ G has a unique associated parse-tree T R . JSON and HTML are examples of two widely used languages that satisfy these requirements, and are our focus here.
In DECO, the prover P and verifier V agree on the grammar G used by the TLS server S for requests and responses. When P then presents a substring R open of some response R from S, we say that R open has context integrity if R open is produced in a certain way.
Specifically
the root in a parse-tree defined by G to internal nodes. Thus s ∈ S, which we call a permissible path, is a sequence of non-terminals. Intuitively, V specifies in S a set of positions in which she might expect to see a valid substring R open in a record R. Each permissible path defines such a position. Let T R , with root ρ R , denote the parse-tree in G for R. We say that a string R open has context-integrity with respect to (R, S) if T R has a sub-tree T Ropen with root ρ TR open whose leaves yield (i.e. concatenate to form) the string R open and there is a path s ∈ S from ρ R to ρ TR open .
Formally, we define context integrity in terms of a predicate CTX G as follows. At a high level, our definition is reminiscent of the production-induced context in [52] . R open has context integrity with respect to (R, S) if
For instance, consider JSON, containing (roughly) the rules:
Start → object object → { pairs } pair → ''key'' : value pairs → pair | pair, pairs key → chars value → chars | object
In the JSON string J in Fig. 3 , V was interested in learning the derivation of the pair p balance with key balance in the object given by the value of the pair p checking with key checking a/c. Each of these non-terminals is the label for a node in the parse-tree T J . The path from the root Start of T J to p checking requires traversing a sequence of nodes of the form Start → object → pairs * → p checking . Note that our definition of a context function can be enriched to include additional or auxiliary restrictions aux imposed by V paths in S, but the above definition suffices for all our applications.
2) Selective opening with context integrity: In addition to selective opening, i.e., proving that R open is a substring of the server's response R, P proves that CTX G (S, R, R open ) = true for the grammar G and the set S specified by V.
Generally, proving CTX G (S, R, R open ) = true without directly revealing R requires expensive zero-knowledge proofs, since computing CTX G may require computing T R for a potentially long string R. However, we observed that under certain assumptions that TLS-protected data generally satisfies, another grammar G ′ , context function CTX G ′ and set of paths S ′ could be defined on strings R ′ derived by applying some transformation Trans on strings R ∈ G.
Specifically, we introduce zero-knowledge two-stage parsing for efficiently computing R open and proving CTX G (S, R, R open ) = true. Suppose P and V agree upon G, the grammar used by the TLS server, and a transformation Trans. Let G ′ , be the grammar of strings Trans(R) for R ∈ G. P and V also agree on V supplied sets S and S ′ , as well as cons G,G ′ , a constraint checking function which ensures R ′ = Trans(R). The two-stage parsing proceeds as follows. In the first stage, P: (1) computes a substring R open of R by parsing R (such that CTX G (S, R, R open ) = true) (2) computes another string R ′ = Trans(R). In the second stage, P proves to V in zero-knowledge that (1) cons G,G ′ (R, R ′ ) = true and (2) CTX G ′ (S ′ , R ′ , R open ) = true. This protocol makes the zero-knowledge computation significantly less expensive by deferring actual parsing to a nonverifiable computation. As we'll show, the computation of
Trans is application-specific. Below, we describe its construction for revelation and redaction in key-value grammars. 
Definition 3. Given a grammar G, a context function and permissible paths CTX
Here, the notation f, σ denotes a function f on input σ, while p c is standard operational semantics notation denoting that if the premise p is true, then the conclusion c is true.
3) DECO focus: Key-value grammars: A broad class of data formats, such as JSON, have a notion of key-value pairs. Thus, they are our focus in the current version of DECO.
A key-value grammar G produces key-value pairs according to the rule, "pair → start key middle value end", where start, middle and end are deliminators. For such grammars, an array of optimizations can greatly reduce the complexity for proving context, as we now show. We support the two modes we discussed above: revelation (of globally unique keys) and redaction. For all parsing here, we use recursive descent [33] . See Appendix E1 for a formal description and further discussion of globally unique keys.
a) Revelation for a globally unique key: For a key-value grammar G, if the context represents a key-value pair with a globally unique key K, the selectively opened string R open simply needs to be a substring of R and correctly be parsed as a pair. Globally unique keys arise in Section VI-A when selectively opening the response for a price. Specifically, Trans can just output a substring R ′ of R containing the desired key, i.e., a substring of the form "start K middle value end" and P can output R open = R ′ . G ′ can be defined by the rule S G ′ → pair where S G ′ is the start symbol in the production rules for G ′ . Then (1) cons G,G ′ (R, R ′ ) checks that R ′ is a substring of R and (2) for
b) Redaction in key-value grammars:
In our applications in Section VI, we need to redact secret parameters in HTTP GET requests as well as certain fields of an HTML page. We do in-place redaction using a dummy character D. HTTP GET requests and HTML have a special restriction: the demarcation between a key and a value (i.e., middle) and the start of a key-value pair (i.e., start) are never substrings of a key or a value. So we have cons G,G ′ (R, R ′ ) check that:
Note that this method leaks the lengths of the redacted strings. One way to prevent this is to truncate all the of dummy strings to length 1 prior to returning an output.
VI. APPLICATIONS
DECO can be used for any oracle-based application. To showcase its versatility, we have implemented and report on three applications that leverage its various capabilities: 1) a confidential financial instrument realized by smart contracts; 2) converting legacy credentials to anonymous credentials; and 3) privacy-preserving price discrimination reporting. For each application, we provide a description followed by implementation details. Due to lack of space, we only present concrete implementation details for the first application, and refer readers to Appendix D for others. Evaluation results for the three applications are presented in Section VII-B.
A. Confidential financial instruments
Financial derivatives are among the most commonly cited smart contract applications [24] , [46] , and exemplify the need for authenticated data (e.g., stock prices) from an oracle. For example, one popular financial instrument that is easy to implement in a smart contract is a binary option [5] . This is a contract between two parties betting on whether, at a designated future time, e.g., the close of day D, the price P * of some asset N will equal or exceed a predetermined target price P, i.e., P * ≥ P. A smart contract implementing this binary option can call an oracle O to determine the outcome.
In principle, O itself can conceal the underlying asset N and target price P for a binary option on chain. It simply accepts the option details off chain, and reports only a bit specifying the outcome Stmt := P * ≥? P. This approach is introduced in [38] , where it is referred to as a Mixicle.
A limitation of a basic Mixicle construction is that O itself learns the details of the financial instrument. Prior to DECO, only oracle services that use trusted execution environments (e.g., [62]) could conceal queries from O. We now show how DECO can do the same.
The idea is that the option winner plays the role of P, and obtains a signed result of Stmt from the O, which plays the role of V. DECO thus supports execution of the binary option without O learning the details of the financial instrument, i.e., N or P.
2 We now describe the protocol and its implementation. a) Protocol: Let SC denote the smart contract with identifier ID SC . To recap, let O denote the oracle and {sk O , pk O } its key pair. In our scheme, a binary option is defined by the asset name N, threshold price P, and settlement date D. We denote the commitment of a message M by C M = com(M, r M ) with witness r M . Fig. 5 shows the steps involved in a confidential binary option. They are:
1) Setup: Two parties-Alice and Bob-agree on the binary option {N, P, D} and create a smart contract SC. The contract contains the public key of the oracle pk O , addresses of the parties, and commitments to the option {C N , C P , C D }. The witnesses to these commitments are shared by Alice and Bob. They also agree on public parameters θ p (e.g., the URL to retrieve asset prices).
2) Settlement: Suppose Alice wins the binary option bet. To claim the payout, she uses DECO to generate a ZK proof that the current asset price retrieved matches her position, i.e., is above (or below) the target P. Alice and O execute the DECO protocol (with O acting as the verifier) to retrieve the asset price from θ p (the target URL). We assume the response contains (N * , P * , D * ). In addition to the ZK proof in DECO to prove origin θ p , Alice proves the following statement:
Upon successful proof verification, the oracle returns a signed statement with the contract ID-Sig(sk O , ID SC ).
3) Payout:
Alice provides the signed statement Stmt to the smart contract, which verifies the signature and Stmt and pays the winning party.
We need to assume here that O is honest to achieve correctness, and can use the standard technique of decentralizing O, as in [29] , to help ensure correctness. b) Implementation details: Fig. 5 shows the request and response of a stock price API containing the relevant details: stock name, stock price, and the date.
The winner of the two parties now executes the second step, i.e., proves that the current stock price is above (or below) the option price using DECO. We use the CBC-HMAC ciphersuite to conduct the TLS session and employ a redaction strategy to keep option details confidential. To extract the stock price, we use a two-stage parsing scheme, where the prover parses the JSON outside the circuit, and only parses relevant keyvalue pairs in the circuit. For example, to prove a statement about the stock price, prover inputs the corresponding keyvalue pair "05. price": "1157.7500" to the circuit, where the number is parsed and compared with the option price (similarly for stock name and date). This optimization is secure under reasonable assumptions, namely, that the keys are unique and that the key "05. price" is followed by the price, making the grammar of this response a key-value grammar with unique keys, as discussed in Section V-B.
The oracle (verifier) also needs to verify access to the correct API endpoint. Note that in Fig. 5 , the parameter function is used to set the API endpoint. So the prover reveals the GET request after redacting values corresponding to sensitive params-symbol (stock name) and apikey. To ensure that extra text is not redacted, P needs to prove that the delimiter "&" and separator "=" do not appear in the redacted text. The security of in-place redaction is argued in Section V-B. Total costs incurred include redacting 7 SHA-2 blocks, computing commitments, and string processing.
B. Legacy credentials to anonymous credentials: Age proof
User credentials are often inaccessible outside a service provider's environment. Some providers offer third-party API access via OAuth tokens, but such tokens reveal user identifiers. DECO allows users holding credentials in existing systems (what we call legacy credentials) to prove statements about them to third parties (verifiers) anonymously. Thus, DECO is the first system that allows users to convert any webbased legacy credential into an anonymous credential without server-side support [50] or trusted hardware [62] .
We showcase an example where a student proves her/his age is over 18 using credentials (demographic details) stored on a XXX Univ. [redacted for anonymity] website. A student can provide this proof of age to any third party, such as a state issuing a driver's license or a hospital seeking consent for a medical test. We implement this example using the AES-GCM cipher suite, extracting age via two-stage parsing (See Fig. 10 ) with optimizations based on unique keys as in Section V-B.
C. Price discrimination
Price discrimination refers to selling the same product or service at different prices to different buyers, in order to maximize profits. The widespread erosion of privacy due to ubiquitous tracking and easily collected customer data enables online shopping and booking websites to employ sophisticated price discrimination [56] . For example, some retailers charge higher or lower based on customer's zip code [36] . Price discrimination can lead to economic efficiency [45] , and is thus widely permissible under existing laws.
In the U.S., however, the FTC forbids price discrimination if it results in competitive injury [30] , while new privacy-focused laws in Europe, such as the GDPR, are bringing renewed focus to the legality of the practice [15] . Consumers in any case generally dislike being subjected to price discrimination. Currently, however, there is no trustworthy way for users to report online price discrimination. DECO allows a buyer to make a verifiable claim about perceived price discrimination by proving the advertised price of a good is higher than a threshold. While doing so, DECO allows users to redact sensitive information such as their name and addresses. We implement this example using the CBC-HMAC cipher suite for the TLS session and redact 12 SHA-2 blocks containing user name and address (See Fig. 11 ).
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATIONS
In this section, we discuss implementation details and evaluation results for DECO and our three applications.
A. DECO protocols
We implemented the three-party handshake (3P-HS) and post-handshake protocols (2PC-HMAC and 2PC-GCM) in about 4700 lines of C++ code. Beginning with the SHA-256 circuit of [22] , we built a hand-optimized TLS-PRF circuit with total AND complexity of 779,213. We also used variants of the AES circuit from [7] . Our implementation uses the Unbound library [55] for the Paillier cryptosystem and the EMP toolkit [58] and the maliciously secure 2PC protocol of [59] for MPC.
We integrated the 3P-HS and 2PC-HMAC protocols with mbedTLS [9] , a widely used TLS implementation, to build an end-to-end system. 2PC-GCM can be integrated to TLS similarly as 2PC-HMAC with more engineering effort. We evaluated the performance of 2PC-GCM separately. The performance impact of integration should be negligible. Evaluation. We evaluated the performance of the three-party handshake and post-handshake interaction protocols in both the LAN and WAN settings. Both the prover and verifier run on a c5.2xlarge AWS node with 8 vCPU cores and 16GB of RAM. We located the two nodes in the same availability zone for the LAN setting, but in two distinct data centers (specifically, in Ohio and Oregon) in the WAN setting. Table I summarizes runtime of DECO protocols during a TLS session. The MPC protocol we used relies on offline preprocessing to improve performance. We measured both the runtime of the offline (i.e., input independent) phase as well as the online (i.e., input dependent) phase. Since the offline phase is input-and target-dependent, it can be done prior to the TLS session. Only the online phase is on the critical path.
As shown by the evaluation, the DECO protocols are very efficient in the LAN setting. It takes 1.40 seconds to finish the three-party handshake, and less than a second to verify or create tags in post-handshake interaction. 2PC-HMAC is efficient as it only involves one SHA-256 evaluation in 2PC, regardless of record size. Thus a larger record size is more efficient when using CBC-HMAC. 2PC-GCM is generally more expensive because it involves not only tag verification but also 2PC-AES for every block in a record. Nonetheless, in the LAN setting the performance is reasonably efficient with preprocessing. In the WAN setting, the runtime is dominated by the network latency because MPC involves many rounds of communication. The proxy-based alternative protocol (Section IV-B3) can completely avoid 2PC-AES.
B. Proof generation
In the proof generation phase of DECO, the prover proves statements about session data using a zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument (zkSNARK). We have devised efficiently provable statement templates, but users of DECO need to adapt them to their specific applications. SNARK compilers enable such adaptation in a high-level language, concealing low-level details from developers. We used xjsnark [39] and its Java-like high-level language to build statement templates and libsnark [2] compatible circuits. We chose a standard proof system [13] implemented by libsnark.
Our rationale in choosing libsnark (as opposed to MPC-inhead [37] or other protocols) is its relatively mature tooling support. The proofs generated by libsnark are constant-size and thus very efficient to verify, the downside being the percircuit trusted setup. With more effort, DECO can be adapted to use, e.g., bulletproofs [19] , which requires no trusted setup but has large proof sizes and verification time. Evaluation. We measure four performance metrics for each of the three examples-prover time, verifier time, proof size, and the number of arithmetic constraints in the circuit. Table II summarizes proof costs. Through the use of efficient statement templates, DECO achieves very practical performance. The prover time to generate the proofs is consistently below 10s for all three applications. Since libsnark optimizes for low verification overhead, the verifier time is almost negligible. The number of constraints (and the proving time) is highest for the binary option application due to the extra string parsing routines. We typically use multiple proofs in each application. Since each libsnark ZK proof has constant size 0.287KB, the proof sizes shown are constant multiples of 0.287KB. As discussed in Section V, we achieve efficient performance by coupling Reveal mode with GCM (application 2) and Redact mode with CBC-HMAC (applications 1 and 3).
VIII. RELATED WORK
Application-layer data-provenance solutions. Signing content at the application layer is a way to prove data provenance.
For example, [23] , [61] aim to retrofit signing capabilities into HTTP. Application-layer solutions, however, suffer from poor modularity and reusability, as they are application-specific. They also require application-layer key management, violating the principle of layer separation in that cryptographic keys are no longer confined to the TLS layer.
Cinderella [25] uses verifiable computation to convert X.509 certificates into other credential types. Its main drawback is that few users possess X.509 certificates. Server-facilitated TLS-layer solutions. Several TLS-layer data-provenance proofs [34] , [16] , [50] that require serverside modifications have been proposed. TLS-N [50] is an extension to TLS 1.3 that essentially enables a server to sign the session using the existing PKI. TLS-N also supports chunklevel redacting for privacy protection. We refer readers to [50] and references therein for a survey of TLS-layer solutions.
Server-facilitated solutions suffer from high adoption cost, as they involve modification to security-critical server code. Moreover, they only benefit users when server administrators are able to and choose to cooperate. In contrast, DECO is a user-side protocol that requires no server-side cooperation or modifications. It is compatible with legacy protocols and readily available today, granting users full freedom and flexibility. Smart contract oracles. Oracles relay authenticated data from, e.g., websites, to smart contracts [20] , [29] , [62] . TLSNotary [3] , an option in the Provable oracle service [6] , allows a third party auditor to attest to a TLS connection between a server and a client. Its techniques are specific to outmoded TLS versions (1.1 or lower), however, with deprecated hash functions and non-forward-secure RSA key exchange. Town Crier [62] is an oracle service that uses trusted execution environments (TEEs) (e.g., Intel SGX) to provide publicly verifiable evidence of a TLS session and do privacypreserving computation on session data. While flexible and efficient, it relies on TEEs, which some users may reject given recently reported vulnerabilities, e.g., [18] .
DECO is free from the above limitations. It is compatible with current TLS versions, doesn't require server-side modifications, and doesn't use trusted hardware. Selective opening with context integrity. Selective opening, i.e., revealing part of a message to a third party while allowing verification of its integrity, has been studied previously. For example, sanitizable signatures [10] , [17] , [54] , [42] allow a signed document to be selectively revealed. TLS-N [50] allows "chunk-level" redacting of TLS records. These works, however, consider a weaker adversarial model than DECO. They fail to address context integrity, which is critical to applications we consider. DECO enforces proofs of context integrity in the rigorous sense of Section V-B, using a novel two-stage parsing scheme that achieves efficiency by greatly reducing the length of the input to the zero-knowledge proof.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have introduced DECO, a decentralized oracle scheme for modern TLS versions that requires no trusted hardware or server-side modifications. DECO allows a prover to generate unforgeable commitments to TLS sessions and efficiently prove statements about session content. We also identified context-integrity attacks that are universal to privacypreserving oracles and provided efficient mitigation in a novel two-stage parsing scheme. We formalized the notion of decentralized oracles in an ideal functionality, providing the first such rigorous security definition. We proved DECO's security in simulation-based proofs. DECO can liberate data from centralized web-service silos, making it accessible to a rich spectrum of applications. To demonstrate DECO's practicality, we implemented DECO and three example applications of it.
The protocol of three-party handshake (3P-HS) protocol among P, V and S Public information: Let EC be the Elliptic Curve used in ECDHE over Fp with order p, G a parameter, and Y S the server public key.
Output: P and V output k MAC P and k MAC V respectively, while the TLS server outputs k MAC = k MAC P + k MAC V . Besides, both S and P outputs k Enc .
TLS server S: follow the standard TLS protocol.
Prover P: On initialization: P samples rc ←$ {0, 1} 256 and sends ClientHello(rc ) to S to start a standard TLS handshake. On receiving ServerHello(rs ), ServerKeyEx(Y, σ, cert) from S:
• P verifies that cert is a valid certificate and that σ is a valid signature over (rc, rs, Y S ) signed by a key contained in cert. P sends (rc, rs, Y S , σ, cert) to V.
• V checks cert and σ similarly. V then samples s V ←$ Fp and computes
• P and V run ECtF to compute a sharing of the x-coordinate of Y P +Y V , denoted z P , z V .
• P (and V) send z P (and z V ) to F hs 2PC (specified below) to compute shares of session keys and the master secret.
• P computes a hash (denoted h) of the handshake messages sent and received thus far, and runs 2PC-PRF with V to compute s = PRF(m P ⊕ m V , "client finished", h) on the hash of the handshake messages and send a Finished(s) to S. On receiving other messages from S:
• If it's Finished(s), P and V run a 2PC to check s ? = PRF(m P ⊕ m V , "server finished", h) and abort if not.
• Otherwise respond according to the standard TLS protocol. Private Input: z P ∈ Fp from P; z V ∈ F 2 p from V • z := z P + zv • m := PRF(z, "master secret", rc rs) (truncate at 48 bytes) • k MAC , k Enc := PRF(m, "key expansion", rs rc) // key expansion • Sample r k , rm ←$ Fp. Send (k Enc , r k , rm) to P, and (r k ⊕ k MAC , rm ⊕ m) to V privately. Fig. 6 : The protocol of three-party handshake.
[57] L. Wang, G. Asharov, R. Pass, T. Ristenpart, and A. 
APPENDIX
A. Formal specifications of protocols 1) Three-party handshake: We gave a self-contained informal description of the three-party handshake protocol in Section IV-A. The formal specification is given in Fig. 6 along with its building block ECtF in Fig. 7 .
2) 2PC-HMAC protocol: The post-handshake protocols for CBC-HMAC described in Section IV-B is specified in Fig. 8 .
ECtF between P and V Input: P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ) ∈ EC(Fp) from P, P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ EC(Fp) from V. Output: P and V output s 1 and s 2 such that s 1 + s 2 = x where (x, y) = P 1 + P 2 in EC. Protocol:
• P (and V) sample ρ i ←$ Zp for i ∈ {1, 2} respectively. P and V run α 1 , α 2 := MtA((−x 1 , ρ 1 ), (ρ 2 , x 2 )).
• P computes δ 1 = −x 1 ρ 1 + α 1 and V computes δ 2 = x 2 ρ 2 + α 2 .
• P (and V) reveal δ 1 (and δ 2 ) to each other and compute δ = δ 1 + δ 2 .
• P (and V) compute η i = ρ i · δ −1 for i ∈ {1, 2} respectively.
• P and V run β 1 , β 2 := MtA((−y 1 , η 1 ), (η 2 , y 2 )).
• P computes λ 1 = −y 1 · η 1 + β 1 and V computes λ 2 = y 2 · η 2 + β 2 .
They run γ 1 , γ 2 := MtA(λ 1 , λ 2 ).
• P (and V) computes s i = 2γ i + λ 2 i − x i for i ∈ {1, 2} respectively. • P outputs s 1 and V outputs s 2 . One-time setup: P and V use 2PC to compute s 0 = f (IV, k MAC ⊕ ipad) and reveal s 0 to P. To compute a tag for message m:
• P computes inner hash h i = f (s 0 , m).
• P inputs k MAC P , h i and V inputs k MAC V to 2PC which reveals H(k MAC ⊕ opad h i ) to both parties. 
B. Protocols details for GCM 1) Preliminaries:
GCM is an authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) cipher. To encrypt, the GCM cipher takes as inputs a tuple (k, IV, M , A): a secret key, an initial vector, a plaintext of multiple AES blocks, and additional data to be included in the integrity protection; it outputs a ciphertext C and a tag T . Decryption reverses the process. The decryption cipher takes as input (k, IV, C, A, T ) and first checks the integrity of the ciphertext by comparing a recomputed tag with T , then outputs the plaintext.
The ciphertext is computed in the counter mode:
where inc i denotes incrementing IV for i times (the exact format of inc is immaterial.)
The tag Tag(k, IV, C, A) is computed as follows. Given a vector X ∈ F m 2 128 , the associated GHASH polynomial P X :
with addition and multiplication done in F 2 128 . Without loss of generality, suppose A and C are properly padded. Let ℓ A and ℓ C denote their length. A GCM tag is
where h = AES(k, 0).
When GCM is used in TLS, each plaintext record D is encrypted as follows. A unique nonce n is chosen and the additional data κ is computed as a concatenation of the sequence number, version, and length of D. GCM encryption is invoked to generate the payload record as M = n GCM(k, n, D, κ). We refer readers to [28] for a complete specification.
2) Post-handshake protocols: In the GCM mode, a single key (shared between P and V) is used for both encryption and Post-handshake protocols for GCM Private input: k P and k V from P and V respectively Protocol for preprocessing On initialization: P (and V) sends k P and (k V ) to F PP and wait for output h P,i i (and h V,i i ).
FPP
After receiving k 1 , k 2 from two parties, compute h := AES(k 1 + k 2 , 0). Sample n random numbers {r i } n i=1 and compute h i n i=1 in F 2 128 . For i ∈ [n], send r i to player 1 and r i ⊕ h i to player 2.
Protocol for decrypting TLS records Prover P: On receiving a record (IV, C, A, T ) from S:
• Send (k P , IV ) to F AES-EqM and wait for output c P .
• Send (IV, X) to V and wait for the response P .
•
• Send (k P , K) to F AES-EqM-Asym as party 1 and wait for output K ′ .
• Decrypt the message as
On receiving (IV, X) from P:
• If IV found in store, abort. Otherwise store IV and proceed.
• Send (k V , IV ) to F AES-EqM and wait for output c V .
On receiving (IV, n, Decrypt) from P: MACing. Thus when receiving records, the two parties need to compute decryption as well as MAC tags in 2PC.
The 2PC protocols for verifying tags and decrypting records are specified in Fig. 9 . a) Tag verification: To verify tags on incoming records, Eq. (1) needs to be computed in 2PC for each incoming record. However, 2PC protocols are usually optimized for a single type of circuit, while Eq. (1) involves both arithmetic computation (e.g., polynomial evaluation in F 2 128 ) as well as binary computation (e.g., AES). Performing multiplication in a large field in expensive in a binary circuit is expensive, while computing AES (defined in GF(2 8 )) in F 2 128 incurs high overhead. Even if the computation could somehow separated into two circuits, evaluating the polynomial alone-which takes approximately 1,000 multiplications in F 2 128 for each record-would be unduly expensive.
Our protocol removes the need for polynomial evaluation. The actual 2PC protocol involves only binary operations and thus can be done in a single circuit. Moreover, the per-record computation is reduced to only one invocation of 2PC-AES.
The trick is to compute shares of h i (in a 2PC protocol) in a preprocessing phase at the beginning of a session. The overhead of preprocessing is amortized over the session because the same h used for all records that follow. With shares of h i , P and V can compute shares of a polynomial evaluation P A C ℓA ℓC (h) locally. They also compute AES(k, IV ) in 2PC to get a share of Tag(k, IV, C, A). In total, only one invocation of 2PC-AES in needed to check the tag for each record.
It is critical that V never responds to the same IV more than once; otherwise P would learn h. Specifically, in each response, V reveals a blinded linear combination of her shares
It is important that the value is blinded by AES(k, IV ) because a single unblinded linear combination of {h V,i } would allow P to solve for h. Therefore, if V responds to the same IV twice, the blinding can be removed by adding the two responses (in
. This follows from the nonce uniqueness requirement of GCM [51] .
b) Decrypting records: Once tags are properly checked, decryption of records is straightforward. P and V simply compute AES encryption of inc i (IV ) with 2PC-AES. A subtlety to note is that V must check that the counters to be encrypted have not been used as IV previously. Otherwise P would learn h to P in a manner like that outlined above.
3) Proof Generation: After the session ends, P commits to the ciphertextM like before. Additionally, P is required to commit to her share of the key k P before V reveals k V . Otherwise, as [32] shows P can decrypt the ciphertext to a different plaintext by finding a different (k, IV ) pair. Committing to k P (and hence k) would fix IV and plaintext, making the scheme unforgeable (See Eq. (1)). a) Revealing a block: P wants to convince V that an AES block B i is the ith block in the encrypted recordr ec. The proof strategy is as follows: 1) prove that AES block B i encrypts to the ciphertext blockB i and 2) prove that the tag is correct. Proving the correct encryption requires only 1 AES in ZKP. Naïvely done, proving the correct tag incurs evaluating the GHASH polynomial of degree 512 and 2 AES block encryptions in ZKP.
We manage to achieve a much more efficient proof by allowing P to reveal two encrypted messages AES(k, IV ) and AES(k, 0) to V, thus allowing V to verify the tag (see Eq. (1)). P only needs to prove the correctness of encryption in ZK and that the key used corresponds to the commitment, requiring 2 AES and 1 SHA-2 (P commits to k P by revealing a hash of the key). Thus, the total cost is 3 AES and 1 SHA-2 in ZKP.
b) Revealing a TLS record: The proof techniques are a simple extension from the above case. P reveals the entire record rec and proves correct AES encryption of all the AES blocks, resulting in a total 514 AES and 1 SHA-2 in ZKP.
c) Revealing a TLS record except for a block: Similar to the above case, P proves encryption of all the blocks in the record except one, resulting in a total 513 AES and 1 SHA-2 in ZKP.
C. Security proofs
Recall Theorem 1. We now prove that the protocol in Fig. 4 securely realizes F Oracle . Specifically, we show that for all adversary A, a simulator Sim can be built such that the ideal execution is indistinguishable from the real execution. We refer readers to [44] for simulation-based proof techniques.
Proof. Recall that we assume S is honest throughout the protocol. Now we consider cases where P or V is malicious.
1) Malicious P: We wish to show the prover-integrity guarantee. Basically, if V receives (b, S), then P must have input some θ s such that S(Query(θ s )) = R and b = Stmt(R).
Note that since P checks the certificate from S, Sim can't cannot simulate S because the secret key cannot be extracted (due to the security of TLS.) Instead, Sim simulates the verifier. Given a PPT adversary A, Sim proceeds as follows: 1) Sim runs A, F ZK and F 2PC internally. Sim records the traffic going to and from A in (Q,R). Note that these are ciphertext records. 2) Upon requested by A, Sim runs 3P-HS as V. By the end,
. Upon requested by A, Sim runs 2PC-HMAC as V, using k
, and that Query(θ s ) = Q. 4) If all of the above checks passed, Sim sends θ s to F Oracle and instructs F Oracle to send the output to V. Sim outputs whatever A outputs. Now we argue that the ideal execution with Sim is indistinguishable from the real execution with A.
Hybrid H 1 is the real-world execution of Prot DECO . Hybrid H 2 is the same as H 1 , except that Sim simulates F ZK and F 2PC internally. Sim records A's input to F ZK to extract her private input θ s . Since the simulation of ideal functionality is perfect, H 1 and H 2 is indistinguishable.
Hybrid H 3 is the same as H 2 , except that V sends input to F Oracle and Sim simulates V. Specifically, Sim samplesx V and usesx V · Y to derive a share of the MAC keyK and use it in the sequential 2PC-HMAC invocations. If Sim receives "prove", it extracts θ s from A and sends it to F Oracle . The indistinguishability between H 2 and H 3 is immediate becausê x V is uniformly random.
Hybrid H 4 is the same as H 3 , except Sim adds the checks in Step 5. The indistinguishability between H 3 and H 4 can be shown by checking that if any of the check fails, V would abort the real-world execution as well. There are two reasons that Sim may abort: 1) Q, R from A is not originally from S, or 2) k Enc , k MAC from A is not the same key as derived during the handshake. We now show that both conditions would trigger V to abort in H 3 as well except with negligible probability.
• Assuming DL is hard in the group used in the handshake, A cannot learnx V . Furthermore, due to the security of 2PC, A cannot learn the session MAC key k MAC .
• The unforgeability guarantee of HMAC ensures that without knowledge of k MAC , A cannot forge tags that verifies against k MAC (checked by V in the last step of Prot DECO ).
• If A sends a different (k Enc , k MAC ) pair than that derived during the handshake to Sim and the decryption and MAC check succeeds, then A would have broken the receiverbinding property of CBC-HMAC [32] . It remains to show that H 4 is exactly the same the ideal execution. Due to Step 5 and 6, F Oracle delivers (b, R) to V only if ∃θ s from A such that R is the response from S to Query(θ s ).
2) Malicious V: As the verifier is corrupt, we are interested in showing the verifier-integrity and privacy guarantees. Sim proceeds as follows: 1) After P sends θ s to F Oracle , Sim instructs F Oracle to send the output (Q, R) to P. Sim learns (Pred(R), S) from F Oracle and the record sizes |Q|, |R|. Sim runs A, F ZK and F 2PC internally. 2) Upon requested by A, Sim runs 3P-HS as P, learning
Sim starts 2PC-HMAC as P to compute a tag τ q on a random Q ′ ←$ {0, 1} |Q| . 4) For each record from S, Sim starts 2PC-HMAC as P compute a tag τ r on a random R ′ ←$ {0, 1} |R| . 5) At the commit phase, Sim sends encrypted data
and that τ r = HMAC(k MAC , R ′ ) for each record. 7) Sim sends (Pred(R), S) and outputs whatever A outputs.
Moreover, Sim instructs the honest P to output. We argue that the ideal execution with Sim is indistinguishable from the real execution with A in a series hybrid worlds.
Hybrid H 1 is the real-world execution of Prot DECO . Hybrid H 2 is the same as H 1 , except that Sim simulates F ZK and F 2PC internally. Sim also invokes F Oracle and learns (Pred(R), S) and record sizes |Q|, |R|. Since the simulation of ideal functionality is perfect, H 1 and H 2 is indistinguishable.
Hybrid H 3 is the same as H 2 , except that Sim simulates P. Specifically, Sim samples x P and uses x P · Y to derive a share of the MAC key k MAC P . Then, Sim uses k MAC P and a random Q ′ = {0, 1} |Q| as inputs to 2PC-HMAC and receives the tag τ q . Then, Sim uses k MAC P and a random R ′ = {0, 1}
|R| as inputs to 2PC-HMAC and receives the tag τ r . Afterwards, Sim commits, i.e., sends encryption of Q ′ and R ′ to A. Sim also adds the checks in Step 7. A cannot distinguish between the real and ideal executions because: 1) Since input sizes are equal, the number of invocations of 2PC-HMAC is also equal. 2) In each invocation of 2PC-HMAC, A learns one SHA-2 hash of the input message which is like a random oracle.
3) The outcome of 2PC-HMAC is also the same due to the added checks in Step 7, i.e., say A cheats by providing wrong tag in the real world leading to an abort, similarly A cheating in the ideal world causes Sim to abort. 4) Since |Q ′ | = |Q| and |R ′ | = |R|, their encryptions are also of equal size and indistinguishable. Hybrid H 4 is the same as H 3 except Sim executes proof phase. In particular, Sim skips invoking F ZK and directly < title > D e m o g r a p h i c Data </ title > < span id = ' EMPLID ' > 111111 </ span > < span id = ' NAME ' > Alice </ span > <span id='BIRTHDATE'> 01/01/1990 </span> ... Fig. 10 : The demographic details of a student displayed on a Univ. website. Reveal mode is used and age is extracted from the highlighted text via our two-stage parsing scheme. provides A with the output obtained earlier from F Oracle , i.e., (Pred(R), S). This is indistinguishable from H 3 because the A receives the same output in the real execution. Moreover H 4 is the same as ideal execution.
D. Application Details
We provide the remaining application details omitted from Section VI here.
1) Age Proof: Fig. 10 shows the demographic details of a student stored on Univ. website such as the name, birth date, student ID among others. The prover parses 6-7 AES blocks that contain the birth date and proves her age is above 18 in ZK to the verifier. Like other examples, due to the unique HTML tags surrounding the birth date, this is also a key-value grammar with unique keys (see Section V-B). Similar to application 1, this example requires additional string processing to parse the date and compute age.
2) Price discrimination: Fig. 11 shows parts of an order invoice page on a shopping website (Amazon) with personal details such as the name and address of the buyer. The buyer wants to convince a third-party (verifier) about the charged price of a particular product on a particular date. In this example, we demonstrate a redaction strategy where multiple personal attributes such as the name and address are redacted from the invoice. We use the CBC-HMAC for the TLS session along with the Redact mode to redact 14 blocks from the invoice. Like other examples, the HTML tags, such as ''City'' with the corresponding values form a key-value grammar. The start non-terminal is of the form <li class=, the middle non-terminal is > and the end non-terminal is </li>. The strings ''<'' and ''>'' never occur within a key or a value, hence reducing the redaction problem to the one discussed in Section V-B under the optimizations.
E. Details on Two-Stage Parsing
We denote context-free grammars as G = (V, Σ, P, S) where V is a set of non-terminal symbols, Σ a set of terminal symbols, P : V → (V ∪ Σ) * a set of productions or rules, S ∈ V the start-symbol of the form of a string G.
We define production rules for CFGs in standard notation using '-' to denote a set minus and '..' to denote a range.
For a string w, a parser determines if w ∈ G by constructing a parse tree for w. The parse tree represents a sequence of production rules which can then be used to extract semantics.
1) Key-value Grammars: These are grammars with the notion of key-value pairs. Key-value grammars are particularly interesting for DECO since most API calls and responses are in fact key-value grammars.
Definition 4. G is said to be a key-value grammar if there exists a grammar H, such that given any s ∈ G, s ∈ H, and H can be defined by the following rules:
S → object object → noPairsString open pair pairs close pair → start key middle value end pairs → pair pairs | "" key → chars value → chars | object chars → char chars | "" char → Unicode -escaped | escape escaped | addedChars special → startSpecial | middleSpecial | endSpecial start → unescapeds startSpecial middle → unescapedm middleSpecial end → unescapede endSpecial escaped → special | escape | ...
In Definition 4, S is the start non-terminal (represents a sentence in H), the non-terminals open and close demarcate the opening and closing of the set of key-value pairs and start, middle, end are special strings demarcating the start of a key-value pair, separation between a key and a value and the end of the pair respectively.
In order to remove ambiguity in parsing special characters, i.e. characters which have special meaning in parsing a grammar, a special non-terminal, escape is used. For example, in JSON, keys are parsed when preceded by 'whitespace double quotes' ('') and succeeded by double quotes. If a key or value expression itself must contain double quotes, they must be preceded by a backslash (\), i.e. escaped. In the above rules, the non-terminal unescaped before special characters means that they can be parsed as special characters. So, moving forward, we can assume that the production of a key-value pair is unambigious. So, if a substring R ′ of a string R in the key-value grammar G parses as a pair, R ′ must correspond to a pair in the parse tree of R.
Note that in Definition 4, middle cannot derive an empty string (i.e. there must be a non-empty string marking middle) since that would not allow parsing keys from values. On the other hand, one of start and end can have an empty derivation, since we really only need them to denote the separation between value in one pair from key in the next.
Finally, we note that in our discussion of two-stage parsing for a key-value grammar, we only we consider permissible paths with the requirement that the selectively opened string, R open corresponds to a pair. Two-stage parsing for a locally unique key. Many keyvalue grammars enforce key uniqueness within a scope. For example, in JSON, it can be assumed that keys are unique within a JSON object, even though there might be dupli-cated keys across objects. The two-stage parsing for such grammars can be reduced to parsing a substring. Specifically, Trans extracts from R a continuous substring R ′ , such that the scope of a pair can be correctly determined, even within R ′ . For instance, in JSON, if cons G,G ′ (R, R ′ ) returns true iff R ′ is a prefix of R, then only parsing R ′ as a JSON, up to generating the sub-tree yielding R open is sufficient for determining whether a string R open corresponds to the correct context in R. Grammars with unique keys. Given a keyvalue grammar G we define a function which checks for uniqueness of keys, denoted u G . Given a string s ∈ G and another string k, u G (s, k) = true iff there exists at most one substring of s that can be parsed as start k middle. Since s ∈ G, this means, in any parse tree of s, there exists at most one branch with node key and derivation k. Let Parser G be a function that returns true if its input is in the grammar G. We say a grammar G is a key-value grammar with unique keys if for all s ∈ G and all possible keys k, u G (s, k) = true, i.e. for all strings R, C:
Concrete two-stage parsing for unique-key grammars. Let U be a unique-key grammar as given above. We assume that U is LL(1). This is, in fact the case for the grammars of interest in Section VI. See [33] for a general LL(1) parsing algorithm.
We instantiate a context function, CTX U for a set T , such that T contains the permissible paths to a pair for strings in U. We additionally allow CTX U to take as input an auxiliary restriction, a key k (the specified key in P's output R open ). The tuple (T, k) is denoted S and CTX U (S, · , · ) as CTX U ,S .
Let P be a grammar given by the rule S P → pair, where pair is the non-terminal in the production rules for U and S P is the start symbol in P. We define Parser P,k as a function that decides whether a string s is in P and if so, whether the key in s equals k. Due to the global uniqueness of keys in U, we can instantiate CTX U ,S using the algorithm in Fig. 12 . On input R, R open , CTX U ,S checks that: (a) R open is a valid keyvalue pair with key k by running Parser P,k (b) R open parses as a key-value pair in R by running an LL(1) parsing algorithm to parse R.
To avoid expensive computation of CTX U ,S on a long string R, we introduce the transformation Trans, to compute a substring R ′ of R, such that R ′ = R open .
For string s, t, we also define functions substring(s, t), that returns true if t is a substring of s and equal(s, t) which returns true if s = t. We define cons U ,P with the rule: substring(R, R ′ ) ⇒ true Parser P,k , R ′ ⇒ true cons U ,P , (R, R ′ ) ⇒ true .
and S ′ = {S P }. Proof. We defer a formal proof to a full version, but the intuition is that if R ′ is substring of R, a key-value pair R open is parsed by Parser P , then the same pair must have been a substring of U. Due to global uniqueness of keys in U, there exists only one such pair R open and CTX U (S, R, R open ) must be true.
